Collaboration among federal agencies is a fundamental feature of administrative policymaking in the United States. The prevalence of interagency policymaking has received recent significant scholarly attention, but has been difficult to characterize empirically. In this research note, we present a novel measure of interagency relationships based on surveys of thousands of appointed and career federal executives who identified their collaborative partners. We first present a descriptive overview, finding that most agencies have a strong tie to at least one agency other than their own, and some have strong ties to ten or more agencies other than their own. We then illustrate the importance of these interagency connections by evaluating the consequences of these relationships for the appointment strategy of Presidents Trump and Biden. Presidents fill vacancies in more central agencies faster than other agencies. We conclude with the implications of this interagency work for political control of the bureaucracy.

Link to paper. Under Review.

Political scientists have emphasized the rightward ideological movement of congressional Republicans across recent decades, relative to a more limited leftward shift by Democrats. However, we argue that this asymmetric polarization has not translated into an equally conservative shift in lawmaking. Drawing on data on the lawmaking effectiveness of Representatives and Senators between 1973- 2021, we demonstrate that conservative Republicans in both chambers are notably less effective than their moderate Republican counterparts in advancing their bills, even when Republicans are in the majority party. In contrast, for Democrats, their liberal wing is more effective at lawmaking than are moderate Democrats. The conservative wing of the Republican Party has been limited in its effectiveness due to lower seniority, fewer committee chair positions, and less frequent bipartisan coalition-building attempts than among other Republicans. As a result, the ideological center of congressional lawmaking has not shifted to the right, instead remaining remarkably stable over time.

Paper is here. Coverage in The Washington Post is here.

The American president is the most visible figure in U.S. politics. Foundational models argue that presidents can make public appeals supporting their agendas, using this visibility to induce legislators to accept more favorable proposals. How has this strategy changed as elections have become more partisan over the past forty years? I develop a formal model exploring this dynamic based on interviews with current and former Members of Congress. In this model, public appeals increase actors’ sensitivities to the electoral valence of a policy outcome relative to its spatial location. Public appeals increase the president's influence, but only when legislators already have electoral incentives to support the president’s proposal. As elections become more partisan, the president's influence through public appeals increases with copartisan legislators but decreases with opposition party legislators. In some cases, public appeals lead to policy outcomes further from the president’s ideal point than if he had stayed silent.

Link to paper. Under Review.

How does partisan competition affect a legislator’s decision whether to retire from office? Existing accounts of legislative careers were written during periods of stable majorities, yet recent decades have seen control of Congress in a sustained period of tight contestation. In this paper, I argue that shifts in anticipated majority status are now a substantial driver of congressional retirements. Relying on in-depth interviews with retired Members of Congress, I develop a theory of loss aversion in congressional career decisions, which I assess empirically using an ex ante measure of anticipated majority party status. I find that legislators retire at higher rates as the probability of minority party status increases, with the largest retirement risk among those most likely to experience loss aversion: majority-party legislators and term-limited committee chairs. These findings provide new theoretical insights into legislators’ career motivations and carry substantial implications for the health of Congress as an institution.

Link to paper. Under Review.